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Abstract—Obtaining high quality sensor information is critical
in vehicular emergencies. However, existing standards such as
IEEE 802.11p/DSRC and LTE-A cannot support either the
required data rates or the latency requirements. One solution
to this problem is for municipalities to invest in dedicated base
stations to ensure that drivers have the information they need
to make safe decisions in or near accidents. In this paper we
further propose that these municipality-owned base stations form
a Single Frequency Network (SFN). In order to ensure that
transmissions are reliable, we derive tight bounds on the outage
probability when the SFN is overlaid on an existing cellular
network. Using our bounds, we propose a transmission power
allocation algorithm. We show that our power allocation model
can reduce the total instantaneous SFN transmission power up
to 20 times compared to a static uniform power allocation
solution, for the considered scenarios. The result is particularly
important when base stations rely on an off-grid power source
(i.e., batteries).
Index Terms—Intelligent Transportation System, Single Fre-
quency Network, Stochastic Geometry, Vehicular Communica-
tions, Power Allocation, LTE-A.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important factor in vehicle-related accidents is a lack
of information: if each driver is aware of their surroundings
and road conditions, many accidents can be avoided [1]. As
autonomous vehicles begin to gain traction, the problem of
ensuring that each vehicle is properly informed will only be
further exacerbated [2], [3]. A key question is therefore how
high quality data can be shared by an Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) to aid drivers in emergency situations.
At present, there are no guarantees that existing
operator-owned base station rollouts will be able to support
communication between vehicles and transport authorities in
emergencies. Moreover, vehicular communication standards
such as IEEE 802.11p/DSRC can only realistically support
data rates that barely exceed 6Mbps [4]. On the other hand,
traditional 3GPP Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A)
cellular deployments can achieve maximum data rates of
100Mbps but have latencies of around 100ms [5], which
is not sufficient to ensure that each driver near or in an
emergency can make informed decisions on routing or evasive
maneuvers [6].
These limitations of existing standards mean that in ve-
hicular emergencies it is challenging to prevent increasing
traffic density and an increase in the likelihood of additional
accidents. For instance, it is difficult to support 5G-PPP’s
“Bird’s Eye” use case, which corresponds to a road intersec-
tion monitored by a set of panoramic camcorders or Light
Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) sensors. These sensors then
broadcast live feeds at a bitrate of several megabit-per-second
to approaching vehicles to notify drivers of possible hazards
ahead [2], [3].
One solution is to install or switch on additional base sta-
tions dedicated to assisting in emergency situations. However,
as the new base stations need to be regularly moved and re-
installed for each emergency situation, or are utilized only for
short time periods, there is little incentive for operators to own
the infrastructure. As such, third parties including municipali-
ties or local governments will need to intervene. To ensure that
there is not a conflict between the operator-owned network
and the emergency municipality-owned network, a network
sharing agreement is required to ensure that the Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements of all users are met [7], [8].
Currently, only a small number of network sharing arrange-
ments to support dynamic instantiations of wireless networks
in response to dynamic changes in demand (such as in emer-
gencies) have been proposed. However, the networks without
borders vision [9] now provides a framework to support the
development of novel sharing arrangements. In particular,
third-party operated networks have been proposed for indoor
network sharing in [10], as well as between operators facilities
such as power plants and large residential blocks in [11].
In this paper, we propose that the municipality-owned
network to aid in vehicle-related emergencies consists of
a small number of base stations that operate as a Single
Frequency Network (SFN) [12]. As such, multiple neighboring
base stations (forming the SFN) broadcast the same Point-
to-Multipoint (PtM) data streams in a synchronous fashion.
This transmission mode has become increasingly common in
LTE-A systems, where it is also known as the SFN-evolved
Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service (eMBMS) [13].
SFNs controlled by simplified core network architectures have
already proved effective in vehicular communication systems,
as they can ensure low end-to-end communication latencies
and high bitraes [14]–[16].
There are two key challenges that must be resolved in order
for a realistic network sharing agreement with operators to
be introduced [9]. First, users served by the operator-owned
network must not have a reduced QoS. To achieve this,
the municipality-owned network can use highly directional
antennas, with the main lobes aimed directly at emergency
users. Second, emergency users must be served with a high
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Fig. 1: Considered system model.
Signal-to-Noise and Interference Ratio (SINR) to ensure that
high quality data can be shared to inform the decisions of
drivers near or in the emergency. To this end, we exploit
the stochastic geometry framework to derive novel analytical
guarantees on the SINR outage probability. These guarantees
then form a basis for power control optimization to meet
SINR targets while minimizing the power usage, which is
particularly important when the base stations are installed only
with batteries rather than a power source connected to the grid.
Stochastic geometry techniques now form an established
methodology for characterizing wireless network performance
[17], where interfering base stations are modeled via a spatial
Poisson point process (PPP). In this methodology, the SINR
is treated as a random variable over the locations of the
interfering base stations. There have only been limited at-
tempts to treat SFNs using stochastic geometric techniques. In
particular, Talarico et al. [18] considered multiple contiguous
homogeneously distributed SFNs; however, this work did not
consider any other base stations that might interfere with the
SFN deployment, which are a key feature in our model.
Our key result is a new upper bound on the SINR outage
probability, which is asymptotically tight as the radius of the
operator-owned network increases. Moreover, we show that
our upper bound is a good approximation for a city the size
of London with realistic operator-owned base station densities.
Numerical evaluation of our bound demonstrates that with a
maximum SFN base station transmit power of only 4.4W a
target outage probability of 0.1 is possible with an SINR target
of 6.3 dB, for a SFN comprising 3 base stations located at a
maximum distance of 300m from an emergency user.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we detail our system model consisting of the
municipality and operator-owned networks. In Section III, we
derive our analytical guarantees on the outage probability
and we use our analysis to optimize the power control. We
numerically evaluate the network in Section IV and conclude
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a municipality-owned SFN that provides emer-
gency coverage to a small area of a city (illustrated in Fig. 1).
In particular, the SFN serves a target cluster of vehicles to
ensure that each vehicle can reliably receive information to
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Fig. 2: An instance of interfering base stations surrounding
the SFN (M = 3, pL = 0.2 and λI = 10−4).
support improve road safety; for example, through a Bird’s
Eye view [2], [3]. Management of the SFN is performed
by a controller, which is responsible for the optimization of
transmission parameters and is the source of the safety data to
be broadcast. Synchronization of transmissions is assumed to
be perfect, which is enabled by a high-speed communication
link with low latency. Each base station in the SFN is equipped
with an antenna array with a highly directional beam. We
assume that the beamwidth of the main lobe is only sufficient
to cover the target cluster. In particular, we assume that the
gain of the main lobe is GS,TX and the gain of the side lobes is
zero. The interfering base stations are equipped with isotropic
antennas with a transmission gain of GI,TX.
Each vehicle in the target cluster is assumed to periodically
and reliably send its location to the SFN controller via the
nearest SFN base station. As such, the SFN controller can
accurately estimate the geometric center of the target cluster.
Each vehicle in the target cluster is equipped with an isotropic
antenna with a receiving gain GRX. This means that trans-
missions from the SFN experience both thermal noise and
interference from the operator-owned network, which serves
users within the city.
We assume that the interfering base stations are distributed
throughout the city according to a two-dimensional homoge-
neous Poisson Point Process (PPP) Φ with intensity λI, as
shown in Fig. 2. In addition, our model distinguishes between
the base stations that are in Line-of-Sight (LOS) with the
center of the target cluster and those that are in Non Line-
of-Sight (NLOS). As such, we assume that an interfering
base station is in LOS with the center of the target cluster
with probability pL, while the probability of an interfering
base station being in NLOS is pN = 1 − pL. Invoking the
independent thinning theorem of PPPs [17], it follows that the
PPP of the LOS interfering base stations ΦL ⊆ Φ and of the
NLOS base stations ΦN ⊆ Φ are independent and with density
λI,L = pLλI and λI,N = pNλI, respectively. In addition, the
relation ΦL ∩ ΦN = ∅ holds. As the SFN deployment is
planned, we assume that the SFN base stations are always
in LOS with the center of the target cluster.
We denote the distance between the i-th SFN base station
3and the center of the target cluster as dS,i. Similarly, the
distance between the j-th interfering base station and the
center of the target cluster is dI,j , which is known to the
SFN controller. Consider the interfering base stations; the
indicator function 1j,L is equal to one if base station j is
in LOS with respect to the center of the target cluster, and
zero otherwise. The path loss component ℓI(dI,j) associated
to the j-th interfering base station is defined as follows
ℓ(I)(dI,j) = 1j,Ld
−αL
I,j + (1− 1j,L)d
−αN
I,j (1)
where αL and αN are the path loss exponents in the LOS and
NLOS cases, respectively. The path loss component impairing
the signal transmitted by the i-th SFN base station and received
by a vehicle at the center of the target cluster simply is
ℓ(S)(dS,i) = d
−αL
S,i .
Since the interference is assumed to governed by a PPP, we
exploit Slivnyak’s theorem [17, Theorem 8.10] and assume
without loss of generality that the target cluster lies at the
origin O = (0, 0) of the axis. As such, the SINR is given by1
SINRO =
GS,TXGRX
M∑
i=1
Pi hi ℓ
(S)(dS,i)
W +GI,TXGRX PI
∑
j∈Φ
hj ℓ
(I)(dI,i)
, (2)
where Pi is the instantaneous transmission power associated
with the i-th SFN base station. The term hi is the small-
scale fading coefficient due to base station i (either a SFN
or an interfering base station). In particular, we assume a
Rayleigh channel model and, hence, hi follows an exponential
distribution with mean equal to 1. Finally, W represents the
thermal noise power.
A key challenge is to ensure that the SINR outages occur
with a low probability. In our model, the main parameters
affecting the outage probability are the instantaneous trans-
mission powers {Pi}Mi=1. As such, we now turn to deriving a
closed-form expression for the SINR outage probability, which
forms a basis to optimize the choice of each Pi.
III. SINR OUTAGE AND RATE COVERAGE
CHARACTERIZATION
In order to provide an analytical model for characterizing
the SINR outage and rate coverage probability, we prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: Let I = GI,TXGRX PI
∑
j∈Φ hj ℓ
(I)(dI,i)
be the interference power at the center of the target cluster.
The Laplace transform of I is
LI(s) =
∏
X∈{L,N}
LI,X(s), (3)
where LI,X(s) is the Laplace transform of the fraction of the
interference power caused by LOS base stations (X = L) or
NLOS base stations (X = N), defined as follows for αX ≥ 2:
LI,X(s) = exp

−2λI,X π2 (GI,TXGRXPI) 2αX s 2αX
αX sin
(
2π
αX
)

 . (4)
1With a slight abuse of notation, notation
∑
j∈Φ represents a sum across
all the points in the PPP Φ.
Proof: We observe that (4) directly follows from [17,
pp. 103-104]. In addition, we remark that ΦL and ΦN are
independent PPPs. Thus, the interference determined by LOS
base stations is statistically independent from the interference
determined by NLOS base stations. Hence, (3) holds.
The general framework for evaluating the SINR outage
probability is given in the following result.
Theorem 3.1: Let µi be equal to Pi d−αSS,i , for i =
1, . . . ,M . Consider the set R = {µ1, . . . , µM} and define
A = {µ1, . . . , µa} as the set composed by the same elements
as in R but with no repetitions. Furthermore, we define ok
as the number of repetitions of µk in R, for k = 1, . . . , a.
Let PT(θ) to be the SINR outage probability with respect to
a threshold θ, i.e., the probability that SINRO is smaller than
a threshold θ. Then, PT(θ) is given by
PT(θ) =
a∏
j=1
µ−okj
a∑
k=1
ok∑
ℓ=1
µok−ℓk
Ψk,ℓ
(
−µ−1k
)
Ωk,ℓ
(
µ−1k
)
(ok − ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
,(5)
where
Ψk,ℓ (t) = −
∂ℓ−1
∂tℓ−1

1t
a∏
j=1,j 6=k
(
1
µj
+ t
)−oj
 (6)
and
Ωk,ℓ (t) = (−1)
ok−ℓ
∂ok−ℓ
∂xok−ℓ
{
e
−
µ
−1
k
θW
GS,TX GRX
x
· LI
(
µ−1k θI
GS,TXGRX
x
)}∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
. (7)
Proof: Consider (2), PT(θ) can be expressed as follows:
PT(θ) = P
[
M∑
i=1
Pi hi d
−αL
S,i > θ
W+ I
GS,TXGRX
]
. (8)
Since {hi}Mi=1 are independent random variables following
an exponential distribution with mean equal to 1, it follows
that {Pi hi d−αSS,i }Mi=1 are independent exponentially distributed
random variables with mean µi = Pi d−αSS,i . From [19], it
follows that the cumulative distribution function of a sum
of exponentially distributed random variables, evaluated in a
point z ≥ 0, which can be expressed as follows:
F(z) =
a∏
j=1
µ−okj
a∑
k=1
ok∑
ℓ=1
µok−ℓk
Ψk,ℓ
(
−µ−1k
)
zok−ℓe−z/µk
(ok − ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
.(9)
From (9), we rewrite (8) as follows2:
PT(θ) = EI
[
F
(
θ
W+ I
GS,TXGRX
)]
(a)
=
a∏
j=1
µ−okj
a∑
k=1
ok∑
ℓ=1
µok−ℓk
Ψk,ℓ
(
−µ−1k
)
(ok − ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
·
µok−ℓk EI0
[
Uok−ℓe−U
] (10)
2With EX[·] we refer to the expectation evaluated with respect to the
random variable X.
4where in equality (a) is the result of the variable substitution
U← µ−1k θ
W+I
GS,TX GRX
. We observe that the following equality
chain holds:
EI
[
Uok−ℓe−U
]
= EU
[
Uok−ℓe−U
]
= (−1)ok−ℓ
∂ok−ℓ
∂xok−ℓ
{LU (x)}
∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
. (11)
We observe that LU(x) can be expressed in terms of the
Laplace transform of I0 as follows:
LU(x) = EU
[
e−Ux
]
= e
−
µ
−1
k
θW
GS,TX GRX
x
LI
(
µ−1k θI
GS,TXGRX
x
)
. (12)
For these reasons, by substituting (12) in (11) and (11) in (10),
and from Proposition 3.1 we obtain (5).
From Theorem 3.1, we also have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1: If the carnality of set A is equal to M , i.e.,
if Pi d−αSS,i 6= Pj d
−αS
S,j , for any i 6= j and i, j = 1, . . . ,M , the
outage probability PT(θ) can be expressed as follows:
PT(θ) = −
M∏
j=1
µ−1j
M∑
k=1
Dˆk LI
(
µ−1k θI
GS,TXGRX
)
, (13)
where
Dˆk = µk e
−
µ
−1
k
θW
GS,TX GRX
a∏
j=1,j 6=k
(
1
µj
−
1
µk
)−1
. (14)
Proof: The proof arises by setting a equal to M and ok
equal to 1 in (5), for k = 1, . . . ,M .
Remark 3.1: We observe that Theorem 3.1 and Corol-
lary 3.1 hold when the network of the interfering base stations
has a radius that tends to infinity [17]. When the radius is
finite, the value of PT(θ) is upper-bounded by the right hand
side term of (5) or (13).
Theorem 3.1 provides a basis to also characterize the rate
outage probability; i.e., the probability that an emergency user
at the center of the target cluster experiences a rate that is
greater than a given threshold.
Theorem 3.2: The rate coverage probability as a function
of a target rate value κ is given by
RC(κ) = 1− PT
(
2
κ
Hσ − 1
J
)
, (15)
where σ is the system bandwidth, while parameters H and
J are rate correcting factors determined by the underlying
modulation and coding scheme, as defined in [20].
Proof: We refer to Shannon’s rate expression
H · σ log2(1 + J · SINR). From [21, Theorem 1] and by
using Theorem 3.1, we can express RC(κ) as follows:
RC(κ) = P[Hσ log2(1 + J · SINRO) > κ]
= P
[
SINRO >
2
κ
Hσ − 1
J
]
, (16)
thus, (15) holds.
By following the same reasoning as in Remark 3.1, we
observe that the right hand side of (15) represents a lower
bound for RC(κ), in the case the radius of the interfering
network is not infinite.
A. Proposed Power Allocation Model for SFN
By exploiting Theorem 3.1, we now optimize the transmis-
sion power of each SFN base station. In particular, we consider
the following Power Allocation (PA) problem
(PA) min
P1,...,PM
M∑
i=1
Pi (17)
subject to PT(θˆ) ≤ Tˆ (18)
0 ≤ Pi ≤ Pˆ i = 1, . . . ,M. (19)
The objective function of the model is given by the sum
of the transmission powers of each SFN base station, which
we aim to minimize in (17). Constraint (18) ensures that the
SINR outage probability is smaller than or equal to a target
value Tˆ ∈ [0, 1], for a target SINR threshold θˆ. In addition,
constraint (19) ensures that the transmission power of each
SFN base station never exceeds the maximum power level Pˆ.
We observe that constraint (19) allows Pi to be equal to 0W
- thus allowing to switch one or more SFN base stations off
if their contribution is not needed to meet the constraint (18).
Due to space limitations, we are unable to provide a
detailed procedure to solve the PA model. We note however
that problem (17)-(19) is related to problem [13, Eq. (21)-
(24)]. Thus, an heuristic solution of the PA model can be
obtained by resorting to the same water-filling strategy as
in [13, Procedure 2].
If we consider typical urban vehicle speeds, the center of
the target cluster is likely to move at a relatively low speed.
We also observe that (18) is the only non-linear constraint
of the PA model, whereas both (17) and (19) are obliviously
linear. Moreover, we note that PT is a non-increasing function
with respect to {Pi}Mi=1. For these reasons, it is also possible
to efficiently derive an heuristic solution to the PA model by
means of a genetic approach [13].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically investigate our emergency
SFN setup. In particular, we detail our simulation framework
and validate our theoretical model against Monte Carlo sim-
ulation. Finally, we investigate how the proposed PA model
performs in different simulation scenarios.
As noted in Remark 3.1, relations (5) and (15) holds. for
networks of interfering base stations with a radius R that
tends to infinity, which clearly is not possible to simulate. In
particular, as the radius of the network reduces, the divergence
of the equations in (5) and (15) increases from the actual
SINR outage and rate coverage probability values. From [22,
Eq. (3.5)], we observe that the simulation accuracy error ǫ
is R ≥ ǫ−1/(αL−1). As such, we considered αL = 2.5 and
simulated scenarios with radius R = 1000m - thus ensuring
a value of ǫ not smaller than 3.16 · 10−5. We account for the
possibility of an interfering base station to be in NLOS with
respect to the center of the target cluster by setting pN = 0.8.
Furthermore, we set αN = 3.5 [23].
We considered a system bandwidth σ = 50MHz, which
is the equivalent bandwidth of an LTE-A system employ-
ing 50 Resource Block Pairs for downlink communications
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Fig. 3: Comparison of simulated and theoretical SINR outage
probability PT.
on each eMBMS subframe [13]. We set the thermal noise
power W equal to 10 log10(k · T · σ · 103) dBm, where k is
the Boltzmann constant and the temperature T is set equal
to 290K [24]. Furthermore, we set the vehicle reception
antenna gain GRX = 10 dB and the transmission antenna
gain associated with the main lobe of each SFN base station
GS,TX = 20 dB, whereas the transmission antenna gain of
each interfering base station GI,TX has been set equal to 7 dB.
Finally, we remark that the goal of our theoretical framework
(see Section III) is that of characterizing the SINR outage and
a rate coverage of an ideal emergency user positioned at the
center of the target cluster, the antenna beamwidth of each
SFN base station has no impact on both our theoretical and
simulation results.
In the reminder of the section, we consider a scenario
with M = 3 SFN base stations located at the coordinates
{(−300, 0), (300, 0), (0, 200)}m and characterized by a max-
imum instantaneous transmission power Pˆ equal to 30W.
The instantaneous transmission power of each interfering base
station PI is set equal to 10W.
Fig. 3 compares the simulated and theoretical SINR
outage probability given in (5). In particular, Fig. 3a
shows the SINR outage probability as a function of
θ, for different densities of interfering base stations
λBS = {0.1 · 10−5, 0.2 · 10−5, 0.3 · 10−5}. As expected (see
Remark 3.1), (5) forms an upper-bound for the correspond-
ing simulation results. In particular, the proposed theoretical
model, as in (5), appears to be quite tight for values of θ that
are smaller than or equal to 16.5 dB. For larger values of θ,
the absolute error between simulation and theory increases but
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i=1 P
∗
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never exceeds 0.13. Fig. 3b provides the same comparison as
in Fig. 3a but in this case PT is expressed as a function of λBS,
for different values of θ. Although the absolute error between
simulation and theory increases as λBS and θ increase, we
observe that the proposed SINR outage probability model
remains proves to be a tight upper-bound.
By considering the same simulation parameters as in Fig. 3,
Fig. 4 compares simulated rate coverage probability values
against those obtained from (15) as a function of κ. In this
performance investigation, we considered an LTE-A commu-
nication system. As such, we set parameters H and J of (15)
equal to 0.17 and 0.06, respectively [20]. Given that the
expression of RC(κ) follows from PT(θ), as expected we
observe that the reported theoretical results lower-bound the
simulated ones. Also in this case, the proposed lower-bound
appears to be tight as the maximum gap between simulations
and theory is smaller than 0.13.
6We regard {P∗i }Mi=1 as the optimized values of {Pi}Mi=1
obtained by solving the proposed PA model by resorting to
a genetic strategy (see Section III-A). In particular, Fig. 5
shows the optimized values of the objective function (17), i.e.,∑M
i=1 P
∗
i . In particular, we refer to a scenario where the SINR
outage probability threshold Tˆ is set equal to 0.1.
Consider Fig. 5a, it shows optimized values of the objective
function (17) as a function of the SINR threshold θˆ, for
different values of λBS. As expected, we observe that
∑M
i=1 P
∗
i
increases as the density of the interfering base stations, or as
the value of the target SINR threshold, increase. However, the
considered optimized PA solution allows us to significantly
reduce the amount of total instantaneous transmission power
compared to a static PA solution - enforcing Pi = Pˆ and,
hence, leading to a total SFN transmission power equal to
M · Pˆ = 90W. This is particularly evident for θˆ = 6.5 dB
and λBS = 0.1 · 10−5, where our PA solution achieves a total
SFN transmission power that is more than 20 times smaller
the static PA solution. The same conclusions can be drawn
from Fig. 5b, which slows
∑M
i=1 P
∗
i as a function of different
densities of interfering base stations, for different values of θˆ.
V. CONCLUSIONS
At present, the IEEE 802.11p/DSRC and LTE-A stan-
dards cannot entirely support the reliable transmission of
information in vehicular emergencies as required by next-
generation ITS services. In this paper, we have proposed that
municipality-owned SFNs are a promising alternative means of
ensuring that drivers have access to this information. To eval-
uate these SFNs, we have obtained performance guarantees
of these networks in terms of bounds on outage probabilities
using techniques from stochastic geometry. These bounds form
a basis for optimizing the power allocation of each base station
in the SFN, which is important when these base stations rely
on off-grid power sources. In the considered scenarios, we
have shown that the proposed PA model can ensure and overall
transmission power footprint that: (i) can be up to 20 times
smaller than a static PA solution, and (ii) meets target SINR
outage constraints.
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